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A B S T R A C T 
 
Romanian social and public policy had so far no outstanding results. 
Several studies outlined either deficient policy design, or poor 
implementation. Despite the alarming conclusions of these studies, 
policy generators did not improve in strategy. The research below 
was initiated to investigate those structures allegedly responsible 
for policy evaluation within ministries as policy generators. Its 
purpose was to identify in the organisational chart the specified 
structures and to pinpoint their functional and methodological 
performance. The scrutiny focused on determining the boundaries of 
the evaluation process, namely to ascertain if the evaluation 
process is taking place during policy design, within the 
implementation period, or post-factum, to assess the evaluation 
process per se and the use of its results 
 
The research report below is identifying key issues in Romanian 
social policy as an introduction to the “in-house evaluation”, which 
considered four of the ministries, i.e. the health, labour, 
education and youth related policy initiators. The introduction is 
designed to acquaint the reader with the particulars of social 
policy in Romania, as well as to give an overview of the main 
meanings of the policy evaluation process. The main part of the 
research is investigating the evaluative structures and details the 
findings within each of the four ministries investigated. A third 
part is presenting evaluation models performed on social policy in 
North America and Western Europe, from an economic perspective.    
 
Sadly, its conclusions pinpoint to the fact that only some 
ministries have an evaluative structure, more often associated to / 
incorporated in other departments; the evaluation process is 
virtually non-existent. No formal evaluation of the policy per-se is 
done. Some programs though, mainly those financed from external 
sources get the benefit of a post-factum evaluation, on a restricted 
form, mainly a cost-benefit analysis designed to establish 
efficiency but with little insight on effectiveness. Moreover, the 
results of such evaluations are of very little use in future policy 
design. 
 
In the absence of future real systematic policy evaluation that will 
actively contribute to its improvement , Romanian social policy will 
continue to be a faint safety net providing for those who fell out 
the economic circuit, with very little chances of becoming an 
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It is generally believed that enough research will tend to support 
one's theory on a subject matter. The facts displayed here are the findings 
of a research project funded by the Romanian Academic Society, which 
allowed an in-depth investigation of the evaluation process of Romanian 
social policy. The theory was that besides the “good policy – bad policy” 
design dispute and rather poor implementation structures, what Romanian 
social policy really lacked was a constructive evaluation process.  
This research started from the assumption that a complex system that 
does not function is invariably found to have evolved from a simple system 
that initially performed well. It is equally true that whenever a system is 
completely defined, “someone” discovers “something” which either abolishes 
the system or expands it beyond recognition. In such a case social 
innovations tend to the level of minimum tolerable well being. This is what 
happened from chronological perspective -- an imported social policy could 
not meet the needs of the host country, no  matter how much “adaptation” 
was performed on it. 
A full account of Romanian social policy is not necessary for the 
purpose of this paper, since so many well-known research reports have been 




written on the subject.1 Therefore, this paper is  only analyzing the 
causes that determined its directions, and circumstances or actions (rather 
counter-actions) which generated its malfunction, and later on, the 
transformations performed on the original system – through evaluation, as 
to adjust it to the specific social environment. It is intended as a review 
of the major causes that lead to the current state of affairs in Romanian 
social policy.  
From a theoretical standpoint any study in this field can focus on 
either policy design analysis – from a sociological perspective – or policy 
evaluation – as result assessment.  
A policy evaluation study can be divided into analyzing the design 
itself or the implementation methods and infrastructure – thus identifying 
the causes and mechanisms that created its results.  
As far as Romania is concerned, policy design was a rather peculiar 
concept. It is already obvious that the social policy of the communist 
government was rather a mechanism of social control than a premise for a 
welfare state. Beyond this, its effects are very well seen today, for it 
created a dependency on the provisions of the state rather then training 
and allowing individuals to act freely for their own well-being.2  
In the “transition process”, one can distinguish three different 
stages of policy reform.  
The first steps taken after 1990 circumscribed to the so-called 
“repairing phase”. An increase in funds for the social protection of 
different underprivileged categories was all that was obtained in this 
period, with no significant policy change. 
  The second phase began with the first elected government in 1992. At 
this point it was decided which imported trend and model of public policies 
was “most appropriate” to the societal needs. Politically, economically, 
and socially speaking, the reform had to be “global”, yet its development 
was sectorial. The fact that the “transition” became chaos is due to the 
                                                           1 ROSE, R. - “Who Needs Social Protection In Eastern Europe; A Constrained 
Empirical Analysis of Romania”, in RINGEN, S., and WALLACE, C., eds. “Societies in 
Transition: East-Central Europe Today”, CEU Publications, 1993; also BARR, N. - 
“Labor Markets And Social Policy In Central And Eastern Europe, The Transition And 
Beyond”, World Bank Publications, 1994;  DEACON, B. ed. - “Social Policy, Social 
Justice And Citizenship In Eastern Europe” Ashgate Publishing Company, Brookfield, 
1992;  DEACON, B., and SZALAI, J. eds. - “Social Policy In The New Eastern Europe”, 
Aldershot, Gover Publishing Company, Brookfield, 1990; McAULEY, A. - “The Economic 
Transition in Eastern Europe: Employment, Income Distribution and the Social 
Security Net”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, nr. 4/1991; * * *  “Romania: Human 
Resources And The Transition To A Market Economy” , World Bank, Washington, D.C. , 
1994; plus articles in almost every issue of Romanian Social Research Journal, 
Bucharest, 1994-2000. 
2 In this respect, a series of recent surveys detected a tendency to define the 
socialist system rather by the welfare provisions, overlooking its ideological 
assertions. Associating socialism with welfare generated a “nostalgic” attitude and 
therefore a resistance to change. This generates distrust for institutions and 
professionals -- briefly creates ways of perceiving social environment as hostile. 
All these effects are a real hindrance to the normal development of a social policy 
process. 




lack of coherence between structural change and policy change. 
Justification could not replace efficiency. The lack of synchronization in 
planning and developing the reform led to a vacuum of social protection, 
and a general confusion between the role of the social policy and the role 
of the free market, due to the fact that the state retreated faster from 
its social functions than from its economic ones. 
Meanwhile, the system faced a crisis, of the means, not of goals. The 
social policy reform program concentrated primarily on directions and 
purposes while postponing the implementation strategies (if not policies 
per se), and totally neglecting the evaluation of the results.3 Moreover, 
it was altered by political and economic constraints: the guidelines from 
international organisms, (IMF, WB), the “mob power”, (culminating with the 
use of social policy as a tool of political legitimization), the 
limitations imposed by the GDP and its fiscal administration (R. Rose, 
op.cit.). All these proved the unsustainability of the policy generated by 
social needs, namely by the effects of the reform4. 
Naturally, all these have had a logical sequential development. The 
fist phase was indeed very prolific in defining a juridical environment for 
a new social policy to take shape, unfortunately starting from the wrong 
premises: trying to implement effects and not causes, it became a passive 
social policy. The purpose was the state intervention in the configuration 
of social processes and the creation of mechanisms to direct this reform 
process towards the socially acceptable level. Its objective was the 
promotion of public welfare and social development in the sphere of public 
services, as defense, health, education, and social security (social 
insurance system and social assistance system). Its provisions proved to be 
only corrective not incentive. It is almost impossible to improve public 
welfare without output growth in productive sectors, yet economic growth 
and rising living standards are unsustainable without effective and 
affordable policy in social sectors. To solve the paradox the input in 
labor market was needed, i.e., restoring the macroeconomic balance and 
improving the efficiency of resource allocation. 
                                                           
3 a very illustrative example can be found in the Romanian Social Research Journal, 
no 1/1995. The Ministry of Health, consulting the medical community and 
international organisms proposes a package of measures designed to reform the 
public health system and obtained resources from the state budget and a substantial 
loan from the World Bank. The rhythm of implementing the reform and the loan 
maturities were not synchronized, due to the infrastructure inefficiency. Thus, the 
loan was paid back, the interest rate and the penalty for non-used funds as well. 
The social costs generated by the lack of reform implementation plus the financial 
costs have had a negative effect on the whole social system and each individual.  
4 Usually the concept of need generats vivid debate as to what should be considered 
or dismissed as need. It was not the case for Romania, since it was not defined in 
the provisions of policy, but estimated periodically as a link between poverty rate 
and eligibility to benefits. Actually, recent data show a massive impoverishment, 
with more then 30% of the population having an income below the defined survival 
threshold.  




At that point, the state was the only actor involved in regulating, 
financing and providing social services, and this was not a matter of 
political choice, but rather of the power vacuum created. Moreover, the 
social system inherited was in a rather bad shape: social sectors 
underfunded, with a deteriorating infrastructure and declining human 
capital. During the first years social sector expenditures were low as 
share of GDP and amounted only to 25% of total government spending , but  
rising to 41% of total public expenditures by the end of the mandate, 
measure followed also by populist socio-economic policies, detrimental at 
large. By the end of 1996 the Romanian economy was in a fairly bad shape 
too, and unable to generate the revenue to sustain an adequate social 
policy. Faint attempts were made to transform it into an active policy by 
delegating authority from central to local level, allowing NGOs to perform 
professional re-conversion and training cycles, allowing health 
professionals to have private practice, same for a few schools and 
universities, yet without any incentive, The market has no important role 
to play yet in social insurance, apart from a few insurance companies whose 
services are a faint imitation of what they should be. 
The third phase began once a new government took over at the end of 
1996, with a new program encompassing drastic measures to reform the 
economic and judicial environment. In the general frenzy social policy was 
left apart. Soon after implementing the first measures of economic re-
structuralization the mass pressure has brought the attention to the need 
of restructuring social policy as well. Budgets assigned were smaller than 
in previous years, yet with a more judicious allocation.  
The worst is yet to come: 10% for social security, paying for social 
insurance, social assistance, and universal benefits. From this, more than 
90% in payment of pensions and other retirement benefits, where the ratio 
active population/retired is 1.5/1. Following the economic re-structuration 
program more than 11% of the active population are already unemployed.5 
Social protection measures provide unemployment benefits for 9 months and 
social assistance benefits for another 18 months, while transfers in cash 
doubled in amount in comparison with the previous year. Apart from the 
rising rate of unemployment due to economic re-structuration the figure is 
increased by virtue of law and distortion of incentives.  Fist of all, the 
legislation regarding the social protection of the unemployed had so many 
alterations that it does not resemble anymore with the initial project. 
Most of the modifications were made under unions' pressure or by nearing 
elections. The fact that one can be considered unemployed after ending an 
                                                           
5 this figure is very relative, since it was calculated taking into account only 
those unemployed registered as receiving benefits. This leaves out all those who 
are not registered at all, all those who circumscribe to long term unemployment - 
out of the benefit scheme already - and on the other hand all those who are 




educational cycle6, the so called “technical unemployment”7, the fact that 
unemployed are not obliged to actively search for work8, the fact that most 
of them already work in the underground economy9, are real incentives to 
stay unemployed. Thus, unemployment is a state of facts, not a process. 
Moreover, in the procedure understood as maintaining macroeconomic balance 
by sustaining already bankrupt industries (with the additional purpose of 
avoiding the potential social conflict generated by reform) social 
protection was created by economic agents instead of being transferred to 
the state10, thus sacrificing the principles of efficiency, of both 
economics and social policy.  
At this point it might be important to notice that the unemployment 
in its present Romanian form creates a new form of consumerism. Addiction 
to welfare provisions (as the last resort for those who are no longer able 
to compete on the labor market) seems to be created by a vicious circle: 
the state is not able to produce and administer a welfare system, yet it 
re-creates the need for one. It is the point where economics and politics 
are in severe contradiction: is it a matter of economics (generating the 
revenue and redistributing it - while gaining from the transfer), or is it 
a political decision (marketing ideologies and using social policy 
provisions as political legitimization tools)? If so, how can one explain 
the discrepancy between the planned short-term revenue and long-term 
planned policies? Is the protection of entitlements the goal or the effect 
of this type of social policy? At this point, one would argue that 
economics is rather subordinated to politics.  
As Romania moves to a market economy, the share of social sector 
spending in government expenditure will continue to rise. On the one hand 
due to the fact that other expenditures will decline as the government 
scales back its role in the economy, on the other hand because relative 
prices associated with economic transition will increase in value terms, 
since inputs used in service delivery were subsidized or accounted for at 
artificially low prices11. 
Moreover, the social need reason is not the last: demographically, 
Romanian population is aging and therefore the demand for social insurance 
benefits and health care linked transfers will increase. Due to the 
difficulties the population is facing the state of health deteriorated and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
registered as unemployed but active on the underground economy, the so-called black 
labor market. 
6 namely freshly trained professionals, graduates, Law nr. 87/1992 
7 i.e. a paid leave of absence if the firm cannot give you anything to do for the 
moment, Law nr. 1/1991 and 22/1996 
8 Law nr. 72/1991 
9 35.45% of GDP in underground economy, according to a source from the Finance 
Ministry 
10 the employees of those enterprises were artificially maintained as active labor 
force or in determined periods of “technical unemployment”, with the specific 
purpose of avoiding social conflicts by their redundancy. In those cases, their 
payment came as salaries and not unemployment benefits.   




chronic illness has an important role to play in the morbidity and 
mortality indicators - this implies not only health care provisions but 
also disability benefits. Business cycles, unavoidable in a market economy, 
will cause household incomes to fluctuate and will enhance the requirement 
for social assistance programs. No matter the standpoint one is taking in 
facing the problem, there are good chances that expenditure will increase 
to sustain transfers in kind or in cash.  
The issue here is whether Romania has the potential resources to meet 
these needs. Despite all odds, a new policy strategy is considered. 
Maintaining macroeconomic balance and regulating market forces to reduce 
excessive size of state sector and avoid fiscal crisis came as first 
priority. Launched as process, social policy issues rise, for several 
reasons. First came the perception that the past economic and social policy 
was a slow way to a less painful death. It became obvious that drastic 
measures were needed and that standards of life would decrease before 
getting any better, and that this process would not happen over night but 
it would take years of deprivation. “Austerity budgets” became the 
statements of the day. The priority given to different policy actions was 
determined in terms of what can be afforded in the short-run, given the 
limitations of both financial resources and implementation capacity. For 
the first time we witnessed policy shifts from passive to active. The most 
important issues concerned wages and employment, managing unemployment, 
social insurance education, health, and lastly, family support and social 
assistance. For each of these issues short and medium term policies were 
defined. It all looks as copied from a social policy textbook. What is 
wrong with it? Let us take them sequential, as introduced above. 
The essence of labor market reform, given the extensive process of 
economic reform, is to stabilize macroeconomic balance and survive the 
fiscal crisis, in order to avoid skyrocketing inflation. This means that 
the state will continue to intervene in labor markets, with an income 
policy to help contain the price of labor and an employment policy to 
minimize the decline in demand. It can be done only by means of a new 
fiscal policy: an active incentive for employers on the one hand, and for 
employees on the other hand12. The problem is that this wage policy has to 
be followed by all sorts of compensations, in order to adjust the 
differences in the scarcity in payment of different types of labor, given 
that the wages are not completely defined by the market, namely by the rule 
of supply and demand. The question is therefore whether to allow an acute 
rise in unemployment as part of the effort of wage containment or not, in 
which case it either encourages the formation of new private enterprises or 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 such as medical supplies, salaries in health and educational sector, etc. 
12 At present in Romania it is more advantageous (leaving apart social status or 
individual aspirations) in the short-run to be unemployed than to have it poorly 
paid honest job. 




gives way to mass protest and trade-union pressures, both of them entailing 
potential massive public expenditure, apart from social costs. Playing by 
the rule would mean to avoid generalized support and create selective 
criteria, something that stands very little chance to be implemented in 
Romania, due to the cultural environment and a peculiar understanding of 
democracy as the state intervention in creating “equal chances”. The 
adequate response would be an active labor policy, anticipating massive 
layoffs and shortening their duration. The anticipatory function is a 
relatively easy task (given adequate network backup), since economic re-
structuralization is following a very well defined plan for almost all 
state-run enterprises: to be re-technologies, to be sold-out to private 
investors, or to be liquidated. Reducing the duration of unemployment is 
also possible, with the condition of active policies. First of all, these 
would involve fiscal policy to generate an incentive for the employers to 
officially hire and train personnel. Secondly, social insurance policy with 
real incentives for active-job search (and penalties for not doing so) and 
re-training programs for the unemployed whose jobs are no longer needed on 
the market or have little value.  
 
2. What is wrong with it?  
 
The value of work depreciated so much, in terms of social importance, 
as well as price that no policy would compensate for that.  
The newly designed policy which creates fiscal incentives for private 
companies to employ newly graduates and released personnel (resulted from 
the massive layoffs in industry) is hardly a solution, since its financing 
is from the state budget. Had the fiscal policy provided tax deduction 
instead of financing, the outcome could have been different.  
Moreover, the “social protection” provisions involve a “compensation” 
to be given to the unemployed resulted from the infra-structural changes in 
industrial environment. How long before these people can be trained into a 
normal labor-market relationship? 
The social security system, conceived as the compound of social 
insurance and social assistance, system of income transfers or cash 
benefits, is the most difficult part to reform, mainly in the conditions of 
the drastic decline of the living standard.  On the one hand it has to 
protect households from crossing the poverty line by redistributing income, 
while the contributions to the insurance funds are not significant at the 
time of the occurrence of a specific contingency (becoming unemployed or 
retired). On the other hand  an income test - with no contribution test - 
would define as eligible far more individuals than it is prepared to 
support given its budget and infrastructure. For the time being it all goes 
as it was. What is wrong with it? It requires short-run fiscal savings and 




sophisticated financial regulatory framework and huge administrative 
capacity. Procedures to determine eligibility, the level of entitlement, 
the forms that have to be filled in triplicate and papers to be shifted 
from one office to another, interminable lines generated by poor 
administration are just a few of the drawbacks. For a more appropriate 
picture one should consider the widening income distributions, the rising 
unemployment, the decline in output, benefits poorly targeted, allowing 
waste and fraud, an aging population, apart from a mentality that the state 
and the enterprise are responsible for the individual’s well-being.  
The new project regarding a social insurance law has the advantage of 
being a burden to the state budget and, in the meantime, a fairly 
inefficient system of rewarding a lifetime work or “compensating” 
structural changes. A single system of “public pensions and other social 
insurance rights” is organized and guaranteed by the state. This will 
integrate all the existing systems and will comprise by virtue of the law 
all individuals within the labor market. Thus, the provisions of the new 
law will cover normal (age-limit) pensions, early retirement pensions, 
disability pensions, survivor's benefits as well as short-term social 
insurance provisions, such as: temporary disability benefits, sick leave, 
maternity benefits and child care allowance, nursing fee, etc.  
Both employees and employers will pay the contribution. For the 
unemployed the contribution will be drawn from the unemployment benefit 
funds. The quota will be established annually and differentiated by field 
of activity. The National Social Insurance House and local services as 
autonomous institutions will implement its administration. The immediate 
advantage of this act is the decentralization in social policy and the 
attempt to terminate universal benefits, placing greater emphasis on forms 
of aid rather than on entitlements.  If it is to be efficient it has though 
to be followed by the creation of a social security net allowing a state-
civil mix or a state-civil and market sector mix, and to concentrate not 
only on already disadvantaged groups. 
Education policy did not benefit from much of a change in the actual 
social policy. It has a fair percentage of GDP to continue within the same 
parameters. Some changes will however affect the system, namely a better 
adaptation of education to the needs of labor market, emphasis on 
graduation from humanities and those technical curricula needed better 
scholarship programs, and campus facilities. A campaign has been launched 
for the introduction of state universities in minorities’ mother tongue. So 
far nothing about incentives for private education centers, apart from 
state recognition, in a fairly laborious process. 
Health policy encompasses measures to promote and preserve good 
health, to provide and finance health care.  The legacy of universal and 
comprehensive coverage is impaired by insufficient financing without 




consideration whatsoever to the costs for the entire economy. While in the 
state run hospital network and ambulatory facilities health care is freely 
distributed and financed through general revenues, pharmaceutical supplies 
are subjected to the free market and inevitably resulted in a cost 
explosion. Investments in acute care facilities were made at the expense of 
primary and preventive care. However, more effective approaches to public 
health and disease prevention are launched - national campaigns to reduce 
alcoholism, smoking and drug-abuse, programs of public training in hygiene, 
family planning, safe sex, etc.  - most of it coming from NGOs, well 
provided for by governmental policy. 
It is important to notice that no radical change in the health care 
system was planned on the short-term, budgets were carefully planned as to 
avoid shutting down critical public health services, as maternal care and 
immunization; emergency departments and intensive care units were 
sustained. Medium term incentives for private practice (improving 
efficiency and consumer choice), wage control policy for health 
professionals13 (capitation payments for general practitioners,  outcome - 
based reimbursement for specialist services), case-mix adjusted budgets for 
hospitals, are to be expected. 
Once this account is accomplished14 one can obviously conclude that 
the policy does not work  because in its attempt to  achieve effects by 
virtue of implementing a policy designed for another society it overlooks 
that cause is to be produced first. It totally overlooked the type of 
society and its premises. Therefore, the effort of implementation faces 
three types of challenges (Barr, 1994): economic, political and 
administrative, exactly the ones ignored as assumptions in our case. 
                                                           
13 one of the poorest paid profession in Romania today, followed closely by 
academics and researchers. 
14 It is obvious that not all the provisions of the welfare state were mentioned. 
However, I found very interesting to describe the example that confirmed the rule: 
housing policy was the most vivid example of unsustainable provision and the 
perfect illustration of what happens to a policy provision dictated by nearing 
elections. During the last six years no change has been made in the socialist 
housing policy, which continued to exist only on paper, for in fact no construction 
was going on, and therefore no allocation granted. On the eve of 1996 elections the 
ex-government issued two laws: one for the restitution of nationalized real estate 
properties and the other for low interest subsidized bank loans for building or 
buying real estate. From our point of view, the second is important. Over-
mediatised, it had a tremendous popularity. When it became active, it was a 
complete failure. First of all due to the conditions of eligibility, then because 
the state was incapable to generate the revenue to sustain the subsidy. In order to 
become eligible, individuals had to prove: marital status: married (what happens to 
those who are single, widowed, divorced or not-married couples?, age: maximum 30 
both partners (what happens to those who are already 31?), no previous ownership of 
real estate property (to avoid fraud, I presume), a bank deposit of minimum 30% of 
the requested loan (in this case who needs the loan?), and income statement to 
prove that earnings can cover the double of the payment plus interest. A simple 
computation can lead to the astonishing result that in order to be eligible for a 
subsidized loan in amount large enough to buy an apartment one needs to contract a 
convenience marriage, to have a life time savings by the age of 30, and the salary 
of a prime minister. In the end the revenue needed to cover the subsidy (the 
difference between the normal interest rate and the15% a.p.r. to be paid by the 




From the economic standpoint it is obvious that the state cannot 
generate the revenue to be redistributed. Fiscal constraint is one of the 
most important drawbacks to the  implementation of the policy and it needs 
no further analysis in the present paper, although it might be useful to 
see what is the way out. The main incentives for activities that generate 
lesser need for welfare are fiscal provisions, but in the meantime the 
budget subjected to redistribution is generated by revenue from taxation 
and contribution to specific insurance funds. Moreover, it has been stated 
before, social policy can go only as far as the GDP and its fiscal 
administration goes. A more efficient re-distribution might be a good 
answer for the financial issue, but it has to start with the very 
definition of need, of the real role of public funds in financing the costs 
of transition, of the difference between welfare state and welfare society.  
Political issues arising are extremely complicated. First due to the 
factors stemming from the absence of political tradition and virtually no 
professional politicians experienced in democratic resolutions. Decisions 
were taken by following policy examples or by marketing ideas to the 
electorate. The balance of power between executive and legislative is still 
poor and it took seven years to convert small interest groups into 
significant parties or consensus fragments able to sustain a program of 
reform. Another factor is the use of social policy as a tool to legitimate 
political power. Used with moderate settlements and improvements at every 
“street claim”, unable to understand radical decisions, masses can easily 
turn into a disruptive “mob” demanding the withdrawal of the government 
unable to provide for their existence and satisfy their demands15. It has 
happened several times and it will continue to happen, since it works16.  
From administrative standpoint, to name them shortcomings is a mild 
term. The entire network that is supposed to implement the provisions of 
social policy , be they in kind or in cash, is obsolete. Understaffed, 
underpaid, poorly organized and harassed by both those to whom it should 
respond, without a law to state the statute of public employee, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
contractor - )could not be produced by the state and the whole provision, although 
active, could not become operative. 
15 Starting from the assumption that we are not discussing basic civil rights, 
social rights as defined by the group who is strong enough to impose them, neither 
by conflict of organized interests, but rather by citizens expectations which were 
generated by politics and failed to be fulfilled by economics.  
16 A rather peculiar phenomenon was going on in 1996: after the presentation of the 
governmental reform program, a very well mediatised campaign followed, explaining 
the social costs of the reform, the massive redundancy to follow, the fact that is 
going to be worst before it is going to be any better. The media campaign was 
followed by a survey whose results showed clearly that the majority of the 
population understands and agrees with the program, understands and agrees with 
“tightening belts” for the next years. Moreover, recent evaluations showed that the 
situation is not as drastic as anticipated. However, the results were made public 
at the end of February, but by the end of March disapproval begun, culminating in 
April with mass protests addressed to the government and its reform program. It is 
still unclear whether the survey was wrong or social policy measures designed to 
alleviate the brutal impact were late. The dramatic consequence of this was that in 




administrative network is a real detrimental experience. In building a new 
social policy an effective public administration is essential - for it is 
the first contact with those whose needs it should meet. The sum of those 
judgments will determine the base of political support for the reform. It 
is something that was understood only after seven years, and designing an 
able, motivated and effective service was only now conceived. Yet, 
inherited bureaucracies are difficult to change, not as much in 
administration but in mentality rather. The role of implementing policy 
handed down from above cannot be shifted into an advisory one, in which 
case it could help shaping a policy so that it could be easily 
administered. In these conditions, policy is designed without endorsement 
of how is it going to be implemented and is implemented regardless of its 
efficiency and goal-achievement.  
 
3. Why is it failing?  
 
First, on account of its instability. Still in its “repairing phase”, 
trying to bring corrections to a system developed (or rather destroyed) for 
over 15 years, it shifts from one provision to another under mass pressure or 
political interest. The paradox  is that in order to maintain the reform 
program, it ends up giving away bit by bit all that has accomplished so far. 
In its transitional form, actual social policy is based on imported elements, 
in an incomplete configuration, for it has only looked at the results 
obtained and did not consider the structural network involved in developing 
it.  Overlooking the very foundation of a social policy, namely a proper 
juridical regulation, an adequate infrastructure and associated state budget 
availability, it was confronted with severe difficulties.  
Secondly, because it overlooked the relationship between individual and 
group, from the perspective of the role, status and contract, the offer of 
the group to the individual, as well as the individual’s offer to the group.  
Given a proper delimitation between the role of the welfare state and 
the role of the civil society would enable the accomplishment of the actual 
complementarity trend, in which transfers in cash are state responsibility, 
while transfers in kind become more and more a societal responsibility.  A 
possible way out for the Romanian welfare system, apart from mending whatever 
is wrong in the design or implementation of social policy, is now only a 
question of social contract.  
Thirdly, the social policy did provide so far active assistance neither 
for prevention, nor for re-socialization or professional integration of those 
groups committed to welfare. This is a major impediment in implementing the 
process, as well as an uneven possibility of diminishing the social 
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consequences of addiction to welfare. And last but not least, the state fails 
to recognize its own incapacity of support an expensive welfare enterprise 
and does not bring any incentive to the private one, while continuously 
generating and re-producing the welfare need. Failing to provide funding for 
the economic re-structuration, it creates tremendous social costs, at the 
expense of both state and individual. Failing to invest in personnel training 
and network reorganization, it increases its expenses, in a vicious circle, 
by paying increasing social benefits and pensions.  
These issues are a direct result of an improper evaluation structure, 
within the policy design and its implementation. So far policy programs have 
had no coherent evaluation process, neither in design, nor in implementation. 
An evaluation in design has not ended once the goals are defined and 
instruments found as to reach the objective. An evaluation in implementation 
is not complete with the definition of infrastructure,  assignment of target-
oriented procedures and a summary check-up of system functionality.    
Again, the issues here not being the quality of the policy itself, or 
the failures of various implementation procedures, let us focus on the 
evaluation process within.  
When launching a specific policy several criteria have to be 
considered: the need, the protection offered, the costs, the service offered 
and accessibility, the side effects. From this perspective, a specific policy 
can be analyzed in terms of “efficiency”, “effectiveness”, “implementation” 
and “utility”17. According to these criteria, during the policy design stage 
or in its implementation stage and afterwards, each performance can be 
evaluated. Thus, the efficiency factor can be described by the cost-benefits 
analysis,18 as a relation between the costs of administrating the system and 
the potential benefits of the proposed goal; the effectiveness of the policy 
can be measured in terms of the impact (Pal, op.cit.), the degree of 
inequality suppressed (Zamfir, op.cit.), - although inequity would be a 
fairer term notwithstanding the Gini coefficient; the implementation 
evaluation can be looked at in terms of the process itself, but also at the 
infrastructure involved – which is inadequate most of the times; last but not 
least, the utility, measured in terms of performance, namely the quality of 
service, the accessibility, versus negative side-effects.  
Since not all criteria above are quantifiable, concentrating on 
measured efficiency gives a distorted picture. Thus, focusing on the number 
of individuals targeted instead of the quality of the service provided, the 
last will be underestimated. Generally, the costs are easier quantifiable 
than benefits, especially in long-term policies. In this case, efficiency 
becomes a chase to reduce costs (Wilding, 1992). Side-effects are never 
                                                           17 PAL, L.A. – Public Policy Research Design and Writing: Overview, Summer Institute 
in Public Policies paper, September 2000 
18 ZAMFIR, C.  – Social Policies: Romania in European context, Ed. Alternative, 
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quantifiable. One cannot measure the responsibility degree induced in the 
general population, or the laisez-faire degree of a whole population of 
welfare addicts.   
Thus, the dilemma of evaluating social policy by objective criteria, or 
value criteria was created.  
There are performance criteria that have to be considered. Such 
criteria involve the costs of system administration, the necessary economic 
resources to reach an objective (how much does it really reach the 
beneficiaries and how much is spent on sustaining the infrastructure that 
delivers the service). The system efficiency is analyzed by following the 
ratio between the costs of a specific service and its quality and quantity. 
(measured by failure\risk indicators). Another important aspect is the 
political sustainability. Any social policy can be used as political 
legitimization tool, but also can backfire if it reaches only a segment of 
the population when paid for by the whole. Internal and international 
coherence criteria (Zamfir, 1995) circumscribes here – if a certain social 
policy is intended to reach a specific target segment, in concordance with 
the political priority or interest statement, to reach international 
desirability or to create transnational consensus.    
Within the frame of these theoretical considerations, this study aims 
to identify any evaluative structure in policy issuing authorities (if any), 
and the methods used in the evaluation process. The hypotheses being that no 
formal evaluation takes place  - except for maybe the cost/benefit analysis 
during the policy design and elaboration process- all feedback is rather an 
elaborated form of national gossip than a real research result of well 
established policy evaluation structures.  
The report below is the result of an investigation in several 
ministries as policy generators, benchmarking the input, the research 
involved and the elaboration process, its output and implementation, and 
finally evaluation (if any) and feed-back mechanism.  
 
 
II. HOW IT REALLY WORKS. THE “IN-HOUSE “EVALUATION FOR SOCIAL POLICIES 
MINISTRIES 
 
The purpose of the study presented below was to establish the function of 
alleged policy evaluation departments within a few ministries as policy 
generators. The investigation followed a specific pattern. Specific 
departments were identified in the organizational chart, its functionality 
and methodology investigated through an interview with the key person, 
following an interview guide. The study aims to identify the way policy 
evaluation is employed in the sphere of social policy. Since this is an 
unexplored area in the study of Romanian administration, we had to rely on 




primary sources: official literature and interviews. We decided to 
interview those closest involved with the evaluation activity. We have 
therefore focused on the most senior civil servant dealing with this issue 
– the actual rank depending on the rank of the department dealing with 
evaluation (direction, service etc).  The definition of social policy is 
not straightforward, neither is the decision in the area of which 
governmental department it falls in. However, since we were mostly 
concerned with evaluation technique rather than with social policy per se, 
we restricted the area of the study to the uncontroversial choices among 
the cabinet level departments: Health, Education, Labour and Youth. In 
each case we have processed information on the activity and recent 
priorities of the department, in order to gauge the scope for evaluation, 
and we identified the locus of evaluation activity within the 
organisational chart of the department.  The interviews have been 
unstructured, but we used an interview guide (see annex), insisting on the 
institutional aspects of evaluation (how powerful the evaluation office 
is, how large and well trained the staff is), what methodology is 
employed, and what role does evaluation reports play in policy decision 
making in the department. The interviews have been performed by Bogdan 
Chiritoiu (Departments of Health and Youth), and Dan Suciu (Departments of 
Education and Labour). However they followed the same pattern. Below we 
present the main findings in each of the four cases investigated. First we 
present some background information on the activity of the department. 
Then we discuss its internal organisation and what office is responsible 
for evaluation. Finally we present the findings from the interview. We 
conclude the chapter with a few overall conclusions on the state and 
prognosis for policy evaluation in Romanian administration. 
 
1. Evaluation within the Ministry of Health 
 
1.1 Overview 
The Ministry of Health used to directly own and manage most of the 
health facilities, and employ the health professionals (as was the case in 
all socialist countries, and somehow similar to what the situation used to 
be in the British National Health Service). 
 
Since 1997, the Romanian health system is moving towards a regional 
social insurance model. Accordingly, many of the tasks previously performed 
by the Ministry of Health and its decentralised units (the County Public 
Health Departments) have been transferred to the National and County Health 
Funds, respectively. These new institutions have also taken over part of 
the staff of the Ministry. Social insurance is a hypothecated tax system, 
and is based on the separation between purchasers and providers. The Health 




Funds are the purchasers of health services from the providers – health 
institutions and professionals – whom they contract19.   
However, the Ministry still preserves a number of important 
functions, concerning the supervision of the health system, the formulation 
of the frame contract (prescribing the services provided by suppliers and 
their prices), and the management of the ‘national programmes’.  
Activity during 1998 – 2000 period 
According to official documents (Ministry of Health, 2000), the main 
objectives of the Ministry of Health for the period after the passing of 
the health social insurance law have been:  
1. Completion of health legislation; 
2. Implementation of the Law 145/1997 regarding the social health 
insurance; 
3. Decentralization, as a way to ensure the institutional reform; 
4. Privatization of health institutions and consolidation of private 
care in primary and ambulatory medical assistance; 
5. Guaranteeing the access of population to health services; 
6. The implementation of the new institutional structure, in order to 
provide a better and efficacious public medical care sector; 
7. To accomplish a modern efficacious organizational structure for 
hospitals and other medical units with beds; 
8. Guaranteeing the financial basis of health care institutions, based 
on performance and on the evaluation of the activity employing the 
cost / benefit criterion; 
9. Guaranteeing a prompt and efficient system for quality control of the 
medical services; 
During the period, the implementation of the system of social health 
insurance had brought up the health sector funding with more than 50%.  
The implementation of social insurance law (145/1997) was made 
possible through the approval of a government emergency ordinance (O.U.G. 
30/1998), which provided for the appointment of the management of National 
and County Houses of Social Health Insurance (the official name of the 
health funds) by the three social partners: government (central or 
regional), trade unions and employers.  
 
1. Completion of health legislation 
The norms for the application of law 100/1998 on health assistance were 
elaborated and approved by ministerial order. DSPs (county Public Health 
Departments) supervise the preventive and curative health services and 
monitor the health providers. The Government Emergency Ordinance  - OU 
124/1999 provided for the reorganization of surgeries, and allowed renting 
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of some facilities and their medical equipment. The whole primary medical 
care and 70% of ambulatory specialist care facilities were privatized this 
way. Hospital ambulatories were established, what created the possibility 
for the hospital physicians to provide ambulatory specialist medical care. 
The 33 national programmes were redefined, establishing the way to 
accomplish them, the responsibilities for them and the different ways of 
funding them. The legislation regarding the work of the National Drug 
Agency was also completed. Additional legislation changes regard the patent 
for pharmaceuticals,  the licensing of drug production and distribution 
units, and the pharmaceutical inspection activity. 
 
2. The implementation of law 145/1997 on health social insurance enabled 
the health system reform. 
The way of funding health services and the stakeholder relationships within 
the system were delimited. Contractual relations were established between 
these partners. They are: the taxpayers (employees and employers), the 
insurance houses (the fund management), and the medical service providers. 
 
3. The decentralization of health services 
The insurance law has opened the possibilities of decentralization for 
primary medical care (family doctors, different forms of ambulatory 
specialist medical assistance). The process was advanced through the law 
100/1998 on the reorganization of health assistance. 
 
4. The privatization of health institutions and the consolidation of 
private care in primary and ambulatory medical assistance; 
The privatization of the ambulatory units was completed based on government 
ordinance OG 124/1999. Nowadays there are private medical cabinets, 
polyclinics and diagnosis and cure centres. Started in 1992, the 
privatization of pharmaceuticals whole sale and retail (pharmacies) 
distribution was accomplished. 
 
5. Guaranteeing the access of population to health services 
There has been little progress in the area of access to health services. 
Access to health services depends on a number of factors, including the 
availability of quality services in the area, but also the ‘medical 
culture’ of the population. The availability of services did not improve in 
the under-privileged areas due to lack of interest from doctors to serve in 
these areas and lack of effort from the  local health funds to offer extra-
incentives to mitigate this. The ministry is interested in training 
mediators specialised in the communication with the Roma community, with a 
view to increasing their participation in the social insurance scheme.  
 




6. The implementation of the new institutional structure, in order to 
provide a better and efficacious public medical care sector 
Preventive medicine has two great objectives: 
1.   promotion of healthy living; 
2. prevention and early diagnosis; 
The national programmes aimed at these 2 objectives. One of the successes 
has been recorded in the diagnosis of diabetes, but a number of problem 
areas persist, as is the case with AIDS. 
 
7. Accomplish a modern efficacious organizational structure for 
hospitals and other medical units with beds; 
 The Health Ministry set up “The National Committee for Hospital 
Licenses”. However, it could not complete its activity till now. The 
Ministry provided technical and organizational support for the committee 
to pursue its activity. 
 
8. Guaranteeing the financial basis of health care institutions, based 
on performance and on the evaluation of the activity employing the 
cost / benefit criterion; 
The private medical units, from the primary medical care and ambulatory 
specialist assistance, with legal personality, are funded based on 
individual contracts or global budgets. The hospitals are funding more than 
90% by contracts between them and the County Houses of Social Health 
Insurance. 
 
9. Guaranteeing a prompt and efficient system for quality control of the 
medical services 
The quality of medical assistance is assessed by a complex evaluation 
method, covering a diversity of medical services, based on national and 
international standards. The Romanian Medical College, according to the law 
74/1995, should elaborate the evaluation criteria. 
 
1.2 Organisation 
The Ministry of Health20 has 238 posts in its scheme, including the 
political appointees (dignitaries and their personal advisers). The 
organisational charta of the department is annexed. A few more political 
structures report directly to the Secretary of State (the official Romanian 
title for the cabinet level position is Minister, while the title Secretary 
of State or Deputy Minister designates the junior minister). The staff list 
also includes a junior minister, a secretary general (the top civil 
servant), and their cabinets. 




The technical activity of the ministry is organized in a number of 
departments, some of them grouped in general departments. There are 
departments or general departments for: preventive medicine, communicable 
diseases, health inspection, pharmaceutical policy, medical assistance, 
medical technology.  
There is also the General Department of Health System Policy, that 
includes the Department of Relations with the County Health Insurance 
Houses, and also the Department of Strategy, Development and Management of 
Resources. In the latter is where evaluation of health policy is supposed 
to take place. 
 
1.3 Evaluation of health policy 
In spite of the ambitious rhetoric, and the abundance of programmes 
that encompass the activity of the ministry, evaluation seems to be non-
existent in the wider activity of the ministry. There are however plans to 
implement some evaluation methods. The Department of Management plans to 
introduce personnel evaluation, while policy evaluation proper does not 
appear to be contemplated. It is however difficult to predict if and when 
this is going to happen.  
The exception is represented by the programmes funded with the help 
of the World Bank. For this type of programmes there is a well-defined 
evaluation methodology, provided for in the official accord between the 
signatory parties.  
The World Bank has been involved in the Romanian health system reform 
since the beginning of the 90s, it provided consulting and assistance for 
the elaboration and implementation of the reform strategy of the Romanian 
medical system. The programmes of the Ministry of Health with the World 
Bank started in 1992, when the first unit of programme management was 
created in partnership with the Bank. Currently, the programmes with the 
World Bank represent approximately 10% of the yearly budget of the 
Ministry.  
The office for the relations with the World Bank has also been 
created then. Following the last re-organization of the ministry (brought 
about by the change of government in December 2000), under direct 
supervision of the state secretary (junior minister), is placed the 
Direction for Privatization and Relations with Foreign Investors, which 
includes the Management Unit of the World Bank programme (separate, but 
still part of the Ministry). 
The initiative for the projects enjoying the support of the World 
Bank comes from the Ministry of Health. Negotiations then begin between 
World Bank and the Ministry. After the project has been clearly defined, 
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the loan conditions are negotiated with the experts of the Ministry of 
Finance, the institution to which the loan is granted. The final stage 
consists of the government approval, the conditions of the project becoming 
law. After this stage is completed, the Bank grants the loan.  
Within these negotiations the monitoring and result indicators are 
settled. The evaluation criteria employed in the World Bank projects 
consist of process / monitoring indicators, result indicators and sectorial 
performance indicators.  
Each Programme Management Unit (PMU) contains two members who are 
responsible for programme monitoring. Although these persons do not possess 
academic qualifications or special training for evaluation work, they are 
civil servants in the Ministry of Health and have acquired experience in 
this type of work. In addition, the Bank may hire from time to time its own 
external evaluators.  
A rather rough criterion employed in programme monitoring by the 
World Bank is the ability to spend the loan in the planned schedule. An 
evaluation of a World Bank programme is conducted half way through the 
programme. For exemplification, within the 1992 project in partnership with 
the World Bank, an evaluation was conducted at mid-term. The evaluation has 
concluded that certain goals could not be achieved or that some projects 
had been either overvalued or undervalued. This conclusion led to a 
reconsideration of the programme and therefore to a redistribution of 
funds. 
However, altering the initial terms of the programme is not 
straightforward. Provided that changes are necessary in the initial 
project, these are established through talks between the experts of 
Ministry of Health and those of the Ministry of Finance. The only 
involvement of World Bank in these talks is that it makes sure that the 
initial object is not altered. If it is decided that changes are necessary, 
a government decision to include those changes is issued. 
An exemplification of the methodology used in the World Bank 
programmes is provided by the case of the 1995 programme on the 
rehabilitation of rural clinics. A number of ten clinics have been selected 
in each county according to certain criteria, including the size of 
population who had access in these clinics. The Bank dealt with supplying 
performant medical equipment, while the Romanian government undertook the 
task of physically rehabilitating the sanitary units and building 
apartments for the doctors in these areas. 
At the end of the programme a comparison was conducted between the 
rehabilitated and the non-rehabilitated clinics. The variables according to 
which the comparison was conducted included the number of consultations, 
and the number of transfers to higher units (ambulatory or hospital).  
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Even with the limited information we had access to, we can conclude 
that the World Bank programmes employ a rather elaborated methodology for 
project evaluation. However, this practice did not spill over in the main 
activity of the Ministry of Health. 
 
2. Evaluation in the Ministry of Youth and Sports 
 
2.1 Overview  
The Ministry of Youth and Sports was established in 1990 as a copy of 
the counterpart ministry in France. It was the first governmental structure 
in the field of sport that Romania had. The Ministry of Sport was set in 
the structure of the Romanian Government on the 28th December 1989. In 
1991, the Ministry of Sport became the Ministry of Youth and Sport (MTS): 
concerning the legal foundations of the organisation and function of the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports, the final act was approved by the government 
on January 5, 2001. 
 
Youth Activity  
The activity of MTS is separated in two large directions: youth 
activity and sport activity. 
For the first segment, youth activity, a number of programmes have 
been developed since 1997. Among these are: medical education, civil and 
religious education, ecological education, partnership, cultural education, 
alternative education, international relations, consulting and information, 
community development, youth events. 
For 2000 at national level there were scheduled to develop 20 
programs. 
In addition, the Centre for Studies and Research on Youth Problems 
aims to build and to administrate certain data bases about youth situation 
and its dynamism. It provides scientific grounding, as well as assistance 
and estimates for the programs that the Youth Department of MTS develops. 
At the present time, the main research areas for the Centre include: civil 
and political participation of young people, labour market for youth, young 
people in situations of social risk, leisure and sport activities, youth 
legislation.  
The Department for Bilateral Relations had as the main activity 
between 1999 and 2000 the relation with The Hungarian Ministry of 
Youth. Another active department of the Ministry is the Agency for 
European Co-operation in the Youth Field. 
The Information and Consulting Centre for Youth - INFOTIN is 
the department which provides young people with information through 
its data base. It offers legal consulting, psychological consulting, 
web hosting services, among other services.  





2.2 Organisation  
In its internal structure, two main departments function: the Youth 
General Department, and the Sport General Department. Each are supervised 
by a junior minister (officially called Secretary of State). There are 
another four departments, which report directly to the General Secretary of 
the Ministry (the top civil servant): General Department of International 
Relations, Economic Department, Department of Human Resources, Contentious 
and Secretariat and the Department of Patrimony and Investments.  
The maximal number of employees, who are working in the central 
structures of the Ministry, is 140. This number includes the political 
appointees.  
Except for the central structure, the Ministry co-ordinates 
decentralised agencies: the Youth and Sport County Departments.  
Other youth related agencies under the supervision of MTS are:  
- the Agency for European Co-operation in the Field of Youth 
- INFOTIN – the Youth Information and Consulting Centre  
- The Centre for Studies and Research on Youth Problems – the only such 
institution in Romania.  
The Youth General Department consists of two General Departments: 
Programmes Department and Syntheses and Evaluation Department. The latter 
includes an Evaluation Office.  
 
2.3 Evaluation of youth policy 
The Direction for Syntheses and Evaluation has existed as an 
autonomous structure within the Ministry of Youth and Sports since the 
beginning of the 90s, and all programmes of the ministry are subject to an 
evaluation process. However, the department has a weak institutional 
position. The personnel of the department numbers only four people. Like 
most of the civil servants of the ministry, they do not have a particular 
training for their specific job.  
Until 1993, the Ministry of Youth and Sports centrally co-ordinated 
the youth activity of the whole country. By establishing the County 
Directions of Youth and Sports (DJTS) and by allowing them a certain degree 
of autonomy, the activity concerning youth was strongly decentralised. 
Thus, establishing the County Direction of Youth and Sports enabled the 
projects of smaller organisations in the country to receive funding with 
less difficulty. The central structure of MTS was left in charge of the 
large national programmes, to set the trend for youth policy in Romania. 
MTS seldom offers funding centrally. Funding is generally granted 
through DJTS. The youth component of the MTS budget is allocated as 
follows: 80% goes to DJTS, 20% remains to the Ministry. At county level the 
division is somewhat similar: thus, 20% goes to DJTS programmes and 80% as 




grants to independent organisation projects. The 80% that go to projects 
initiated by independent organisations are divided between the 13-14 
national frame projects, according to the degree of interest they enjoy in 
the county. Therefore, another condition for an NGO to receive funding from 
DJTS is to qualify for one of these frame programmes. 
Although at the beginning of each political term the new Minister 
introduces some initiatives, the programmes have stayed mostly the same 
throughout the nineties. With regard to shifts within a national programme, 
these can occur at the initiative of the programme manager. None of these 
changes appear to have been influenced by evaluations of running 
programmes.  
The approval process for any project is quite an elaborated one. It 
requires four sanctions: that of the director of the relevant youth 
department (depending on the programme), of the Economic Department, of the 
State Secretary and of the Minister. Again, the evaluation (of past 
activities) does not appear to have played a major role in any of these 
stages.  
Actually, at the end of any project there is an evaluation, conducted 
by an assessor (one of the employees of the respective DJTS). However, this 
is a formal evaluation. The criteria taken into consideration are whether 
the activity took place in the specified conditions (number of 
participants, period), and whether the budget was respected. There is no 
evaluation of the impact of the project or of its cost-benefit value. A 
report is done following the spending of the money that was granted, and 
this evaluation will be taken into account in considering the next funding 
application from the respective association. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, when the MTS activity was not fully 
decentralized, each DJTS used to send at the end of each year files 
containing the records of programmes accomplished in the respective county 
throughout the year. These records had an assessor’s recommendation as 
appendage. The decisions on the frame programmes for the following year 
were influenced by the results obtained from the analysis of these records. 
Another type of evaluation within MTS is that of frame programmes. 
Once every three months, DJTS report a summary of the projects they funded, 
and in which frame programme they fit in.  
The Ministry of Finance requires an evaluation of the activity of 
MTS, requiring data on cost-efficiency and indicators of performance. 
However, these reports seem to be filed only formally, and whatever use do 
they have for the Ministry of Finance, they do not influence the allocation 
of resources within MTS.  
For example, budgetary allocations within the ministry among the 
different counties employ as criteria: the amount spent in previous year, 
the percentage of young people in the county, existence of university 




centres, percent of young people involved in a form of education, 
population of the county. Again, the impact, and performance of the 
previous activity does not figure as a formalised criterion.  
 
In conclusion, as suggested by the above description, although the 
Youth General Department of MTS does have a structure apparently 
specialized on evaluation, it performs only a very limited activity in this 
field. The only formal evaluations conducted concern process indicators, 
like adherence to the draft of the project and to the budget. There are no 
impact or cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, expected impact or cost-benefit 
estimates do not play any role in the funding decisions in the ministry. To 
the extent they play any role, it is through an implicit and unformalised  
procedure. In addition, the only formalised evaluation process to guide the 
strategy of the ministry appeared to be the demand for funding on certain 
type of projects coming from NGOs.  
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations: 
The proper evaluation plays a modest role in policy design in the 
Youth General Department of MTS. The main causes for this situation are:   
1. Numerically reduced personnel – only four persons serve the Department 
for Evaluation of the Youth General Department; the personnel in the 
county offices (DJTS) is also very small, and they cannot devote 
resources to evaluation; 
2. Lack of specialized training – both of the people of the Evaluation 
Department and of those from the DJTS;  
3. Lack of specialized structures in counties (if within the central 
structure of MTS there is an apparently specialized department in this 
direction, such departments are missing in the case of a DJTS); and 
especially 
4. Lack of political will, probably resulting from lack of understanding 
what policy evaluation is, and what its role could be. 
 
3. Evaluation in the Labor and Social Solidarity Ministry. 
 
3.1 Overview  
By the governmental decree 4/2001, the Labor and Social Protection 
Ministry has been reorganized into the Labor and Social Solidarity 
Ministry. The change concerns mainly the name, not the functions. It was 
not a deep structure reorganization, when the Government was changed in 
November 2000, as the ministry remained a very important institution.  
Two major changes were put into practice though, changes that had 
been planned but only reached maturity with the new organization. They 




meant de-centralizing the activities involving the ministry. Thus, the The 
National Social Insurance House and Social Security Rights as well as the 
National Agency of Employment and Professional Training have become public 
autonomous institutions, which are subordinated to the Ministry’s 
management as their two presidents are Secretary of State within the 
ministry.  
 
The functions and the organization of the ministry. 
Subsequently, an important part of the ministry’s traditional 
functions – coordinating the pension system, the programs against the 
unemployment as well as managing the employment strategies – have become 
the agencies’ responsibility. The ministry only offers the administrative 
and legislative support for the activity of the two institutions.  
The ministry’s basic functions are limited to setting up the 
political strategy, to regulating the domain and elaborating the 
legislative framework as well as ensuring the legislation’s compliance with 
the European norms. As a matter of fact, by Governmental Decree, every 
ministry had to regulate the latter activity by setting up a Secretary of 
State’s Office within the ministry.  
The ministry is the one that administrates the budgetary funds. It is 
the ministry that decides the programs the National Employment Agency will 
apply, and also it checks the way they are put into practice. Therefore, it 
is in charge with all the activities this controlling involves: sets up the 
programs, draws up the laws, accredits the local branches of the agencies, 
checks up how the agency’s budget is administered, elaborates the system of 
wage adjusting in the public domain.  
As far as the pensions and the social security are concerned, the 
ministry’s activity is similar: it elaborates the program and the laws 
necessary to the activity of the The National Social Insurance House, which 
puts them into practice. The ministry controls how the budget is 
administered according to reports of budgetary administration and how the 
pension system is implemented. The Labor and Social Solidarity Ministry is 
in charge with elaborating, controlling and applying the activity in the 
social security and family policies field. It also has to regulate and 
control the field of work relationships and labor safety. From this point 
of view, the ministry’s staff chart reduced to 256 positions.  
On the other hand, the two agencies’ staff reaches several thousands 
persons, including those working in the local county branches. The ministry 
also coordinates the activity of the National Scientific Research Institute 
in the Labor and Social Security Field/Domain and the National Research-
Development Institute of Labor Safety whose function is to draw up 
evaluations and prognoses, or expert research studies on the ministry’s 
request. 





3.2 The evaluating activity 
The evaluating activity is, by its nature, a basic one. This is true 
especially with regard to the Employment Agency and The National Social 
Insurance House. Even so, within the ministry there is one single Division 
of strategy, social indices and IT, with 13 positions, half of which are 
dedicated to the ministry’s software system administration. In fact, the 
division developed from a software and data administration department into 
one whose function is to gather statistic data and generally contribute in 
evaluating processes.  
The exclusive evaluative function is quite recent. As a matter of 
fact, the division is monthly editing the ministry’s Statistic Journal, 
comprising the main statistic evolution indices in the field, a working 
tool necessary to all the ministry’s divisions or to the agencies the 
ministry coordinates. That is why the division is subordinated to the 
ministry’s General Secretary, who gathers the demands from all the other 
divisions or agencies that want to contribute with information. But the 
division’s function is to contribute to the evaluations written out by each 
division apart or, more precisely, to provide the initial evaluation data.  
The ministry intends to develop the Division of strategy, social 
indices and IT precisely for involving the latter more in the evaluating 
processes. Moreover, under the programs the Government is discussing with 
the World Bank, there is a consultancy project for setting up this division 
and for strengthening its strategy and evaluation component. The ministry 
officials are discussing two possibilities: whether the division should 
have a well-defined formal structure, with an extended staff chart, or the 
ministry should have a non-formal structure in charge with these processes 
of strategy and evaluation, made up by experts from the various divisions 
who would gather together around projects for long-term evaluations and 
strategies.  
Within the ministry, the spokesperson’s office affiliated to the 
press department is in charge with monitoring the feedback on the 
activities initiated by the ministry as mirrored in the media. Media 
monitoring addresses the Secretaries of State, the Minister or the 
interested divisions. There are daily and weekly synthetic reports of media 
monitoring. Sometimes, the management solicits that the division should 
monitor certain topics mirrored in the media (feedback on the social pact, 
on the unions actions etc). 
 
The Institutional Mechanism 
The ministry’s activity is regulated by the government strategy, 
which is the political document stipulating the main guidelines and 
deadlines for the major activities. The ministry’s management board, whose 




chairman is the minister, sees that the respective guidelines and deadlines 
are respected.  
The major changes, the important decisions are taken by consulting 
the management board or according to the report of a working group made up 
of experts from the ministry’s various divisions. The mechanism of the 
legislative drafting supposes an indirect evaluation, as every report needs 
to be compliant with the European legislation in that domain as well as 
with that of the other international conventions Romania is signatory to. 
The European integration department’ observations, which only had a 
consultative function so far, have received decisional power since the 
department was promoted to Secretary of State’s Office.  
A legislative change comes as a result whether to a political 
decision, or to the feedback on economic evolution that was statistically 
monitored by the specialized division within the ministry. This is the kind 
of activity that requires with the most time and the most numerous 
resources and starts with the initial evaluation of the data provided by 
the specialized division (wage increasing, dysfunction in the relationships 
with the social partners such as the unions etc). Any normative decision 
starts from an internal motivation that acts like an evaluation, whether it 
is an impact study or there are just a few simple indices without any 
further comments. Initiating a legislative change must specify as 
fundamental information the cost items it entails and identify them as 
such. 
The Labor and Social Solidarity Ministry’s whole budget is not 
earmarked for each program apart. As one of the ministries holding a large 
share in the budget’s structure, there has not been a program deduction 
yet, even though the money necessary to the two autonomous agencies are 
specified as separate funds in the budget. The evaluation activity is 
required specifically and is mostly benefiting of separate budgetary funds, 
for each of the activities running under certain programs. These are the 
programs in collaboration with foreign partners – the World Bank or some 
national partner agencies. The program for connecting all the local 
branches of the Employment Agency to the internet in a national network 
that would enlarge the activity field, program run in collaboration with a 
foreign agency, required periodical evaluations, as stipulated in the 
written agreement signed by the two parties. In exchange, the activities 
that are not part of a financing program do not require specifically 
evaluations of their impact. The evaluations are rather optional than 
compulsory. In general terms, the ministerial employees are responsible for 
the formal monitoring of the activity, of the projects evolution even if 
this is not specified in the normative decision that regulates the activity 
(law, governmental decree, governmental ordinance, internal regulations). 
This monitoring is carried out by each division for every one of its 




activities, employing data such as social indices provided by the 
specialized division, consultancy/assistance from other divisions, but most 
of all its own evaluations. That is the reason why the evaluations are 
rather formally highlighting the fact that the activity has or had certain 
measurable results. Most of the times the activity does not close on a 
cost-profit evaluation or one of public policy strategy. 
The Employment and Professional Training makes its own evaluations 
based on the performance indices, it sets by itself within the 
Administration Board. Thus, even though it is the Ministry that decides the 
Agency’s budget, the former makes no direct evaluation according to some 
clear criteria. The ministry sets the political guidelines and the budget 
while the “intermediary” evaluation is made informally, as the Agency’s 
president is Secretary of State within the ministry, member of the 
ministry’ Management Board. If the need of legislative changes or 
amendments to the governmental decrees is felt due to the evaluations, the 
agency’s president brings the issue forward to the Minister while the 
latter distributes it whether to the Secretary of State or to the 
specialized division that performs the required changes. In order to come 
into effect, the new regulations follow the reverse path. From the division 
or divisions concerned to the minister, gathering on the way 
recommendations of all those involved in the elaborating process. As far as 
a legislative change is concerned, the law draft is endorsed by the 
minister and then goes to the Government, according to the joint 
responsibility principle.  
The agency’s system of initial evaluation may have some achievements 
as well. As a result to feedback on how many people were re-employed after 
having taken professional training courses, it was noticed that only an 
average 4% had found working places according to their new training over 
the last year. The result entailed an internal decision of the Agency, 
endorsed by the ministry, to stop financing the professional training 
courses. This measure is considered an achievement within the ministry, but 
they do not discuss a mechanism that would ensure for such decisions not to 
well-defined performance indices from the starting point (minimal number of 
persons re-employed according to the new training, cost evaluation). The 
decision was taken based on the statistical reports, but did not trigger a 
report for failure evaluation.  
 
3.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
1. The Division of strategy, social indices and IT should be developed 
towards a division bound to make evaluations, whether as a result to the 
project of consultancy and staff training in collaboration with the World 
Bank, or as an initiative of the ministry itself. 
 




2. Introducing as compulsory the periodical evaluating processes since the 
programs are set up, on the pattern of the international programs that 
require these procedures. A political decision should impose the 
evaluations as standard procedure within the ministry. 
 
3. The observation reports and the long-term and medium-term strategy plans 
should be compulsory to avoid the need to regulate the domain in emergency 
cases. For instance, the status of the persons laid off was regulated just 
by a series of ordinances and amendments to the latter, and no coherent 
strategy (Governmental Ordinance OUG 9/1997 on certain measures of 
protecting the persons who are going to be dismissed due to mass lay-off, 
amended by OUG 52/1998; OUG 22/1997 for the mining industry, amended by OUG 
68/1998, OUG 7/1998 for the military; OUG 69/1998 for SNCFR (Romanian 
National Rail Company) personnel; OUG 36/1998 for power industry personnel; 
OUG 100/1999 for the military; OUG 146/1999 for the metallurgical industry 
personnel; OUG 98/1999 for modifying the entire legislative framework, 
amended by OUG 185/1999, OUG 77/2000 and OUG 98/2000!) 
4. The ministry should also settle, once tit establishes the budgetary 
funds, the performance indices for each of its divisions as well as for the 
autonomous agencies. 
 
5. The monitoring should be carried out by a different division than the 
one that is also implementing the program for implicit subjectivity to be 
avoided. 
 
6 The minister’s responsibilities should be reduced, as it is the only 
person who intermediates between the ministry’s divisions and the 
autonomous agencies. Thus, evaluating the activities of these institutions 
would entail more efficient legislative or internal changes that were 
proven necessary. 
 
4. Evaluation Within the Education and Research Ministry. 
 
The Governmental Decree 23/ 2001 (GD) led to the ministry’s reorganizing by 
making the research department part of the education ministry. As a new 
initiative, the GD has mainly focused on regulating this new domain since 
the education domain is considered at least from this perspective to be 
regulated. The education remains coordinated by two Secretary of State’s 
Offices, each of them in charge with different departments -  secondary and 
academic education, which share various administrative and financial 
divisions. The ministry directly coordinates or collaborates with a series 
of consultative councils that have to evaluate the educational policies.  
 




4.1 The functions and the organization of the ministry. 
The ministry’s function is complex, since it is managing the activity 
of over 350,000 employees. From this perspective as well as a result to the 
specificity of the education activity, the evaluations are the most 
important responsibilities of the ministry’s central unit. Thus, the 
ministry’s function is to elaborate the strategy and to implement the 
policies; also, through prognosis, planning, monitoring and resource 
evaluation to control the way the educational policies are put into 
practice. The are some consultative councils with a role for the evaluation 
process as such: national Concil for Educational Reform Natioanl, Natioanl 
Concil for University Financing, National Board for  ,National Concil for 
School Financing 
The ministry is also centralizing a series of data and evaluation research 
provided by: Center for University Financing and University Education 
Research, National Servicies for Evaluation and Examination, Center for 
profesioanl development “Leonardo da Vinci” National Agency " 
 
4.2 The evaluation activity 
As this is a giant institution, with over 27,000 education centers 
and 500,000 teachers, one of the main problems the ministry confronts is 
conveying/forwarding the information in the nick of time as well as 
implementing changes and programs altogether with gathering feedback 
information. As a matter of fact the ministry’s main channel for 
communicating with the subordinated institutions are the media, since the 
ministry’s local branches aren’t able to cope with the informational flux 
on time. That is why, heads of various local branches have heard from the 
media of the strategic changes, of the new programs to be implemented, 
either programs specifying the subject matters to be taught or social 
programs related to education. The ministry has tried editing an 
informative Journal. For the moment, the journals the ministry has begun 
editing do not have a well-defined periodicity, they only contain the 
internal documents of the ministry and have a limited circulation (1400 
copies), unable to comply with the huge demand. Moreover, its distribution 
is difficult and delayed including within its own network. The problems 
begin with the lack of a budgetary source, well-defined from the very 
start, for this activity. Therefore, it often happens that the president of 
some university has to find out from the media about decisions affecting 
the university he is leading. For coordinating this department for 
communication and feedback monitoring, there is a public relations and 
communication division, subordinated to the ministry’s General Secretary 
Office, which has been employing 5 people since 1997, its main activity is 
to establish communication channels with the local institutions 
subordinated tot he ministry by means of the media and to simply perform a 




press monitoring of the feedback for a possible subsequent evaluation 
activity. Since other alternative methods have not imposed themselves 
(informational transfer through the internet or other information networks) 
the messages in the press from the ministry to the institutions or the 
other way round remain the main communication channel. In the department 
there is an attempt of putting into practice a program of monitoring and 
content analysis based on an algorithm of the messages taken from or 
received through the media. The project may offer an evaluation of the way 
messages are perceived in the media, so that the ministry’s strategic 
message should not be distorted in its way to the receiver, as well as an 
evaluation of the social impact of structural changes and processes ongoing 
in the education. Without such an evaluation that would allow correcting on 
the way the information or the form, especially for deep structure changes, 
it happens for the reform measures to be perceived as foreign through the 
media by the educational system. Such a situation triggered a defense 
reaction from the union leaders by initiating numerous strikes, mostly due 
to the confusion or the lack of accuracy of the message received from the 
ministry. 
 
4,3 The institutional mechanism. 
There’s a significant difference between the ways of evaluating the 
academic education as compared to the secondary one. If in the former case 
evaluation is more de-centralized due to the universities’ autonomy and the 
education’s general effects are rather evaluated through a consultative 
mechanism based on programs, as far as secondary education is concerned 
evaluation and monitoring is more dedicated and related rather to the 
current/ongoing activities. Within the academic education, the programs 
benefiting of international financing are monitored according to the 
contracts either directly by the ministry or through certain agencies. The 
main mechanism when discussing the global policies is a consultative one, 
which gathers together the board of presidents in general or and the 
ministry management. These meetings hold a certain regularity and, even 
though not always concluded with a formal document, they suppose an on the 
spot evaluation of the decisions the minister took regarding that domain.  
When the information lacks and the formal evaluations need a longer period 
of time, this mechanism functions with a certain proved efficiency (this is 
the case of university presidents’ feedback on the ministry’s initiative to 
limit the number of students paying annual fees at the universities or on 
the initiative to create technological campuses around the technical 
universities for extra financial sources).  As the function of the 
Secretary of State’s Office in charge with the academic education is 
limited by the universities’ autonomy, by the elaboration of some rather 
vague strategies mostly in response to the occasional crises (an activity 




that takes in fact the entire time of the central department) evaluating 
the academic education remains first of all the responsibility of each 
university, while the general conclusions are to be drawn by the board of 
presidents, except for programs such as Phare, Socrates etc, which are 
coordinated, financed and evaluated by separate agencies.  
For the educational process the evaluation has a special meaning. First of 
all it implies a mechanism of establishing the results of the educational 
process, therefore of the school activity. As far as our analysis is 
concerned, this is not the domain of interest. We might perhaps take 
interest in the way results of this evaluation will influence the decisions 
at a very general level, or the structural programs with social impact. 
Within the  ministry the division using this information for evaluations 
and prognoses is part of the Secretary of State’s Office for the secondary 
education. The General Division of Evaluation, Prognosis and Development 
received explicitly the evaluating responsibility only due to the last 
restructuring process. But the division imposed that the term “evaluation” 
should be adopted, because this kind of activity was one of its constant 
functions. First of all, a measuring  evaluation is concerned. It is the 
kind of evaluation coming after the baccalaureate or the final exam when 
graduating from primary school: based on numerical criteria, it aims at 
statistically measuring the situation. Moreover, the division has as a 
function to make institutional evaluations, with an emphasis on evaluation 
of the human resources, of the professional and managerial training. These 
are the basis of the education programs and for allotting the budgetary 
funds to the secondary loan operators and are performed in collaboration 
with or by employing data and information provide by the National Service 
for Evaluation and Examinations (which gives quality and quantity 
information about the educational performances). From another perspective, 
it offers information about the institutions subordinated to the ministry, 
of the managerial performances of the local branches. There are also 
evaluation files on the professional performances and in the same time it 
is intended that they became part of the management contracts for the 
persons in leading positions.  
Two deputy directors as well as a technical secretary office are 
subordinated to the general manager. Every deputy director coordinates two 
structures. The service/department for school network and institutional 
programs performs the following kinds of activities: monitoring the school 
network, writing down the education plan, statistical syntheses, 
institutional programs, school methodology and civil protection. The 
department writes down the statistic balance on the pupils’ circulation in 
the educational system, data related to the current infrastructure or to 
the teachers’ vacancy. Hence the school attendance figures on which the 
budget is based. The division is also in charge with elaborating logistic 




solutions for the organization of the educational process when the data 
periodically provided by the local branches show these changes are 
necessary. Also the division must support logistically the changes brought 
about by the new education policies (such as transferring by 2003 the ninth 
grade from the high school to the compulsory primary school, which implies 
evaluating the logistics and the teachers necessary to this gradual 
transfer process). The function of the Department for institutional 
[programs and professional development is to settle the standards of 
professional evaluation, to control the centers of psychological-
pedagogical  assistance and of supervising and evaluating the social 
programs for the rural education.  This department holds an important 
social function by involving in extra school activities such as the centers 
of psychological-pedagogy (for the relationship pupil-parents) and the 
teachers’ resource centers.  
Even though it benefits of a database allowing to draw long-term strategies 
and to monitor the latter’s evolution, the ministry is still punctually 
reacting to problems through a stimulus-response kind of mechanism. This is 
why, even when the feedback becomes well known, it still requires an answer 
which is urgent and does not allow for it to be used for a subsequent 
evaluation. There is also a department focused on financing issues, in 
charge with the private and alternative education, with the institutional 
financing and check-ups, as well as a department of management and 
institutional resources for schools, whose function is to evaluate the 
management  problems and to train these managerial resources within the 
local branches.  
The ministry’s normative decisions settle the evaluating activity as 
compulsory, concerning either the educational policies or the subordinated 
institutions and the employees. Due to the problem typology, the latter 
kind of evaluation is prevailing. 
 
4.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
1. The ministry should pass the stage when most of the analyses are 
retrospectively written down through a stimulus-response kind of 
reaction to problems. The ministry should set this long-term goal even 
though this means personnel increasing within its headquarters that 
would be able to monitor and put into practice the pre-set program in 
crisis situations too, when this doesn’t modify the basic structures of 
the program. 2 
2. The mechanism of communication and implicitly of feedback monitoring 
should be improved so that the employees should not see the changes as 
foreign to the system. This implies perfecting a mechanism of periodical 
consulting with the involved factors, including at the local level and 
especially  employing the reactions as feedback. Thus it is recommended 




that the communication department be supported and strengthened to 
collect and provide the feedback to the specialized divisions  
3. A mechanism of evaluating the faculties or universities should be 
settled – a project under discussions in the presidents’ board – which 
would transform the academic evaluation in a permanent and active 
process. This project would also allow for the evaluations’ results to 
be used when funds obtaining depends on them. This function could be one 
of the responsibilities of the Academic Evaluation Board.  
4. This kind of evaluation should be extended at the secondary and primary 
education level too as a main financing mechanism which would supplement 
the per capitas system. This would imply increasing the responsibilities 
of the evaluation division, which would deal with the evaluations at a 








In this last part of our paper let me look at both the institutional 
set-ups and the evaluation techniques used in the field of social and 
labour market policy in North America and Western Europe and to formulate 
some conclusions for institutionalising social policy evaluation in 
Romania. 
 
To this end, the chapter is organised as follows. The first part 
presents a brief genealogy of the evaluation cultures in the last thirty 
years from an economical perspective, i.e. by emphasising the interrelation 
of evaluation practices, prevailing ideologies and changing paradigms in 
economics. The second part generally describes the organisation of social 
and labour market evaluation in North America. The case of evaluation in 
Western Europe is the topic of the third part, which looks at experiences 
with evaluating labour market policy measures in Germany and Austria. The 
analysis turns to the Romanian perspective on social policy evaluation by 
drawing possible conclusions from the evaluation of the Austrian Steel 
Foundation, a redundancy-retraining project. The final part summarises the 
lessons drawn from the described models and their relevance for designing 
an institutional framework for social policy evaluation and advice in 
Romania. 
The innovative momentum of the paper is our argumentation, applied 
for Romania’s social policy, that there is a tremendous need for 
institutionalising - besides the ministeries departaments previously 
presented (Chapter 2) - an external evaluation instance for both ex-ante 




and ex-post evaluation missions. Without this, the economic rationality 
will be unable to prevail over political logic, the evaluation practice 
will necessarily turn into a bureaucratic ritual and eventually have to be 
abandoned. We argue that recent social policy making and evaluation in 
Romania perfectly illustrates this case by being subject of power relations 
and deeply under the influence of the political cycle. Therefore, we 
outline why, in the context of the Romanian social policy, the transition 
to a culture of program evaluation should be hastened through a new 
organisational set-up which will provide new incentives for rigorous 
scientific standards both in the case of commissioned and of non-
commissioned evaluations. 
 
1. Economic Rationality and the Transition to a Culture of Evaluation 
 
Politicians want to be right, but economists want to be right for the 
right reason. This is why, while there might be big controversy in the 
political sphere, one might expect some consensus in the economic discourse 
on the methods for and reliability of social policy evaluations. Studies 
analysing the making and the use of evaluation research21 show that this is 
not the case. The same arguments stemming from economic theory could be 
applied by evaluators in different contexts and lead to opposing outcomes, 
in favour or against the efficiency of the evaluated program. Moreover, 
arguing from the perspective of Public Choice Theory22, it is likely that 
methods and results of commissioned evaluations are distorted by being 
biased towards a favourable result. 
The concepts and practice of evaluation as a source for civil society 
rapidly gain ground in North America as well as in Europe: ”An emphasis on 
objective publicly accessible evaluations is a distinctive feature of the 
modern state, especially in an era of limited funds and public demands for 
accountability.” (Heckmann et al. 1999). The modern ”industries” of policy 
evaluation have their sources in the United States, in the early 1970s - 
the period when the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System was established. 
To put it simple, in economic terms this period marked the beginning of a 
paradigm change – best illustrated in the public finance debate Musgrave 
vs. Buchanan – which lead eventually to a shift from a vision dominated by 
market failure to one based on the failures of government: policy failure. 
This last vision builds also the framework of the newer attempts to 
modernise the public administration and to reform the welfare state. All 
these are actually based on models that try to simulate the market 
mechanism in the process of public policy decision making (New Public 
                                                           
21 See Henry (2000) for a literature review. 
22 e.g. Mann (2000). 




Management, Contract Management, etc.)23.The analysis and evaluation of 
social policy was for a long time of scarce interest in the literature on 
economic theory24. This came to a halt in the 1960s when economic analysis  
began providing help to understand and design the welfare state. In this 
period, in the U.S., Mancur Olson25 strongly argued for establishing a 
social report which should be an equivalent to the Economic Report that the 
Council of Economic Advisers yearly presents to the US president. 
The basic idea of the social report was that there is a need for 
assessing the social implications of policy interventions and to provide a 
rigorous framework for organising the practical evaluation research. This 
also helps to recognise and quantify the way in which social implications 
of policy affects key decisions and identifies economically relevant 
institutional features. 
 
2. A Political Economy of Social and Labour Market Policy Evaluation in 
North America 
 
Institutional arrangements and funding for evaluation research in the 
U.S. have been evolving and changing during the last half of the 20th 
century. Evaluations have been funded and implemented by both private and 
public sector organisations. In addition in the U.S. the for-profit sector 
has contributed to evaluation of social welfare programs. For stylising a 
market model for both commissioned and non-commissioned policy evaluation 
we distinguish between a supply side (who are the organisations who perform 














Figure:  The political market for program evaluation 
Source: own presentation, drawing on: Frey, Kirchgässner 1994, Ch. 13, 
                                                           
23 New Zealand is the striking example of such reforms. 





- government agencies 
- governmental 
research institutions 




- for-profit consultants 
- non-profit consultants
- academic researchers 
political business cycle 
Exogenous Influences 
overall economic situation 




Mann 2000 and Downs 1965 
 
2.1. Categories on the Supply Side: Who Are the Evaluators? 
On the supply side of the political market for program evaluations in 
the U.S. four main groups could be categorised26: 
- government employees, 
- for-profit consulting firms, 
- non-profit consulting firms, 
- academic researchers. 
Both the advantages and disadvantages of ”in-house” evaluation 
performed by the first group, of government employees, are straightforward. 
The advantages are that the staff is very familiar with the programs and 
the operating agency as well as with the sources and nature of data 
collected for the evaluation. This kind of evaluation can also be easily 
controlled and closely monitored. The main disadvantages are properly 
described in the Public Choice literature27: distorted information, 
incentives to maximise the total and the discretionary budget (”slack-
budget”) of the agency28, etc... All these contribute to the view of ”in-
house” evaluation as a mean to increase the bureaucrats utility, which 
might be his hidden strategy of commissioning evaluations – in case that an 
evaluation of a program under his supervision is not obligatory. 
To the second group, of for-profit consulting firms, belongs a great 
variety of corporations, ranging from those purely concerned with empirical 
and evaluation studies (such as MATHEMATICA or WESTAT29) to large consulting 
firms with smaller departments doing evaluation work (such as Gross 
Gilroy). The for-profit evaluations are done generally in a professional 
way. Using the lenses of Principal-Agent theory one can allege that, if the 
same firm (Agent) repeatedly evaluates the same governmental agency 
(Principal), incentive problems might arise if the agency rewards positive 
evaluation. This will be particularly the case when the agency plays an 
important role for the firm’s business plan. 
As a conclusion one can state that there is a tendency of 
collaboration between these diverse groups of evaluators. The common 
practice, at least for large-scale evaluations, tends to be that of 
evaluations contracted from the government and then subcontracted with 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
25 Mancur Olson et al.: Towards A Social Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1969 
26 Smith (2000), pp. 346-47. 
27 See Mann (2000) for a brief overview and Downs (1967), Frey, Kirchgässner (1998), 
Kirsch, Mackscheid (1985) for public choice models of bureaucratic behaviour. 
28 The rational for this is that income, power, prestige are functions of budget 
size. 
29 Insights on their research agenda and evaluation methodology could be obtained 
from their homepages: MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH Inc.:www.mathematica-mpr.com; WESTAT: 
www.westat.com. 




academic researchers30. This mixture could offer the possibility of 
combining the virtues and eliminating some of the weaknesses of the single-
performed evaluations. 
 
2.2 The Demand Side: Who Pays the Evaluations? 
The sources of funding policy evaluations in North America are 
threefold, i.e. three different types of organisations are paying for 
evaluations and act thus on the demand side: 
- government (both state and federal) agencies 
- governmental research organisations 
- private foundations. 
The government agencies – which usually also run the program to be 
evaluated – are the major sources of funding. Social and labour market 
programs are often evaluated both at the federal and state level. This 
programs also tend to be run jointly by the federal government and the 
states or provinces in both the U.S. and Canada. 
The second source of evaluation funding, the governmental research 
organisations, are separated bodies from the agencies that run the program. 
A prominent example is the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Usually 
the NSF, like most of these governmental research institutions – tends to 
sponsor methodological research. But in the context of social policy and 
program evaluation, this methodological research has a practical nature and 
immediate and important implications.31 The methodological research done by 
the 2000 Nobel Prise Laureate in Economics, James Heckman, on the sources 
of selection bias in social programs evaluation (Heckman et al. 1996) and 
on the alternative methods of estimating the impact of social programs 
(Heckman, Smith 2000) belongs to the category of fundamental studies with 
practical and immediate policy implications sponsored by the NSF. 
 The third source of funding are private foundations. Unlike the 
European countries private foundations have played an important role in 
U.S. evaluation research. Some of the evaluations supported by private 
foundations follow an interest in the expansion of specific types of 
programs – derived from the aims of the foundations – and the evaluation 
record will provide evidence that supports the development of these 
programs. 
The existence of both public and private souses of funding evaluation 
work, and especially of sources not tied with the agency that operate the 
program is essential for providing credible views about program efficacy. 
 
2.3 Issues of Control: Who Evaluates the Evaluators? 
                                                           
30 See Smith 2000 for details. 
31 For the place of social programs evaluation in-between science and politics, see 
DIW (2000) and Wyplosz (1998). 




From the point of view of the practitioner, the question of quality 
control for policy evaluation – Do evaluators ask the right questions and 
use the proper methodology for answering them? – is twofold. On the one 
side there is an information or knowledge problem: How does one know 
whether the evaluation is good or poor? On the other side, the already 
mentioned incentives problem will be: What could work against the 
incentives to bias the results of an evaluation in favour of the program 
being evaluated? 
We identify two main lines of quality control for social policy 
evaluation32: the first through the standards imposed by the government 
(the agency that commissions and eventually will make use of the results 
from the evaluation) and second, the standards imposed by the scientific 
community. 
The North American experience shows (Smith 2000, pp. 347-8) that the 
presence of trained staff with sufficient expertise to co-design, follow 
and evaluate the evaluation enormously improves the quality and policy 
value of the evaluations. 
In his analysis of labour market policy evaluations in North America 
Smith (2000) shows also the two ways in which the academic world also plays 
important roles in the process of evaluating the evaluations. On the one 
side, academics are asked to review the evaluation work done by consulting 
firms on behalf of an agency. On the other side, most of the evaluators are 
trained in academia and thus carry with them in their work the values they 
inherit there – which ”act as an internal quality control mechanism”. 
(Smith 2000, 347). 
At this place one first conclusion is to be drawn for the search of 
evaluations models for Romania. Namely, the importance for policy makers to 
realise why any serious evaluation effort has to follow a set of standards 
well-accepted in the scientific community – the strict reliance on 
evidence, a sound selection of data sources, searching the sources for 
possible errors as well as the standard of publicity – and that it cannot 
be done ”in-house as an addendum to the usual accounting procedures” 
(Schmidt 1999, p.3)33. In Romania, as in other countries with scarce 
tradition of independent scientific evaluation, most of the conclusions on 
the efficacy and efficiency of social policy measures are left unsupported 
by any empirical evidence. 
 
3. Labour Market and Social Policy Evaluation in Western Europe 
 
                                                           
32 We draw our conclusions mainly from Smith 2000: ”Evaluation aktiver 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik: Erfahrungen aus Nordamerika” and Schmidt 1999: ”Knowing What 
Works: The Case for Rigorous Program Evaluation”. 
33 See also the critics of commissioned evaluations from Public Choice perspective 
done by Mann (2000). 




Program evaluation was born in the U.S. and was imported in the 1970s 
in most northern European countries. Many of the agencies, units or 
commissions created to carry out policy analysis ”had an inter-ministerial 
scope and they clearly aimed at introducing some scientific rationality in 
the budgetary process” (Toulemonde 2000, p.351). Most of the countries that 
adopted the evaluation methods based on the U.S. model of Planning-
Programming-Budgeting-System have gone beyond it or abandoned it. 
Afterwards, the practice of social policy evaluation developed differently 
in the EU-countries: under diverse external and internal influences and in 
varying proportions from country to country. 
 
Since active labour market policies (ALMPs) are an integral part of 
labour market policies of the transition countries in Eastern Europe we 
will limit our observation on policy evaluations to this field. 
In the political debates labour market policies to reduce 
unemployment rates remain a top priority in Europe: in most countries 
unemployment rates are high and show little sign of falling. In different 
countries, a large number and wide variety of policies have been 
implemented. Moreover, a new drive followed the Luxembourg Job Summit of 
November 1997, which proposed targets for EU member countries in terms of 
participants in various training programmes. In view of the large costs of 
operating these programmes it is regarded as important that sound research 
should be conducted in the field of policy evaluation to provide a 
framework for identifying best practices within the current political room 
of manoeuvre. 
 
3.1. Social and Labour Market Policy Evaluation in Germany 
3.1.1. The Institutional Framework 
In contrast to the U.S. institutional setting of policy evaluation – 
which is dominated by a great variety of private funded independent 
research institutes, the so called think tanks34 – in Germany the evaluation 
landscape is dominated by mostly public funded research institutes. This 
research institutes do primarily contract work for different ministries – 
both on the state and on the federal level. The evaluation work they do 
refers to the impact of national policies as well as to specific policy 
interventions and local programs. 
The framework for all the evaluation research in the fields of 
economic and social policy in Germany is build by the annual evaluation 
report of the ”six big economic research institutes” and by the report of 
the German Council for Economic Advice. The two annual reports are very 
                                                           
34 For a good analysis of the role of think tanks in the U.S. in comparison with 
Germany, see Cassel (2000). 




often the most quoted documents in the political debates on social policy35 
or for supporting (or not) the implementation of different programs for the 
labour market or social security. 
 
Both of these reports are commissioned by the federal government. The 
”big six” research institutes36 are on the so called ”blue list” of research 
and evaluation institutions, which means that their funding is provided by 
the states and by the federal government jointly. 
Actors on the Demand Side Actors on the Supply Side 
- Federal Government 
- State Government 
- National Foundations 
- Private Foundations 
- Governmental Agencies 
- Research Institutes (mostly public 
funded) 
- Consulting firms 
- Academics 
 
For specific policy interventions and local social programs, two more 
institutions could also be named: the Centre for European Economic Research 
in Mannheim (with commissioned evaluations in the fields of social security 
and active labour market policies, see also 3.1.2.) and the Institute for 
the Study of Labour in Bonn ( member in the European Research Network on 
Evaluation of Labour Market Policy and Projects)37. 
In Germany, on the supply side of the market for public policy 
evaluation, the academic community also plays an important role for 
developing an evaluation methodology, praxis and culture. Most of the 
evaluation work done in academia is funded indirectly 
(Drittmittelforschung) – not through the University’s budget– by public 
institutions (federal government, national foundations, local authorities) 
or by private organisations (private foundations). 
Another specificity of program evaluations and policy advice in 
Germany are the so called experts surveys or questioning 
(Expertenbefragung)38 practised especially by the Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs. These are interviews with an iterative character 
utilised as a ”soft procedure” in the ongoing evaluation of specific 
programs. Their role for program implementation and policy analysis resides 
in: 
                                                           
35 As is currently the case with debating the public pensions and retirement 
system’s reform. 
36 German Institute of Economic Research (www.diw.de); Kiel Institute for World 
Economics (www.uni-kiel.de/ifw), Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
(www.hwwa.de), Halle Institute for Economic Research (www.iwh.uni-halle.de), Ifo – 
Munich (www.ifo.de), RWI-Essen (www.rwi-essen.de).  
37 Some of the research outcomes are available online: (www.zew.de) and 
(www.iza.org). 
38 For a competent survey on this practice in social and labour market 
interventions: Brinkmann et al., Eds., (1995). 




- acquiring information in fields with a lack of transparency and 
expertise, 
- building policy networks with(in) the scientific community, 
- providing arguments for a discursive validation of policy interventions. 
On the demand side, besides the governmental sources of funding 
(local, state, federal) national and private foundations are increasingly 
promoting independent evaluation research on social and labour market 
programs, as well as on different attempts of privatising social services. 
The German Research Foundation (DFG)39 is the central public funding 
organisation for academic research in Germany – and could be regarded as 
the German counterpart of the National Research Foundation. Striking 
examples of private foundations which support evaluation work on public 
policies are the Volkswagen-Stiftung or the new program of the Bertelsmann 
Foundation on Performance Comparison in Public Administration40. 
As stated above (3.), due to the great re-allocation of labour during 
the transition, active labour market policies (ALMPs) are an integral part 
of labour market policies in Eastern European countries. This is why we 
choose to look at two experiences with evaluating policy interventions in 
this field: the evaluation of ALMPs in East Germany and the case of 
evaluating the Austrian Steel Foundation (Stahlstiftung). Given the purpose 
of our paper, we will give only a very brief overview of these two policy 
treatments. Since their diverse evaluations fit into the institutional 
framework previously described (3.1.1) we will look only at the 
methodological practices. From this point of view, the two selected 
programs might deliver some insights for evaluation practitioners involved 
in the implementation of comparable policy interventions in Romania – on 




3.1.2. Active Labour Market Policies in East Germany– Some Insights 
from Evaluations 
Without using the lenses of a normative analysis on the possibility 
of ALMPs, the aim is to present some structured thoughts and some sources 
of available literature which should be useful for further evaluation 
research in Romania. 
One of the striking models of evaluating interventions in the labour 
market for Romania could be the evaluation of German ALMPs, i.e. the use of 
job creation and training programs following the German unification. 
Active labour market policies are intended to assist unemployed 
individuals in finding work and to make the labour market as a whole 
                                                           
39 Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (www.dfg.de). 




function more effectively. ALMP programs in Germany included employment 
training, job-search assistance and employment subsidies to direct job 
creation. The legislative mandate of these initiatives is to be sought in 
the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (AFG). The most important element of the AFG 
are Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABMs), measures that try to create 
directly employment that serves the public interest while providing the 
long-term unemployed with training and labour market experience. Such 
programs were widely used in Germany in the early 1980s to address the 
issue of unemployment resulting from regional economic restructuring (e.g., 
the mining region of the Ruhr Valley). 
The central research question of evaluating these programs is: ”Do 
these treatments reduce unemployment or provide only a new vehicle for 
delivering unemployment benefits?” 
The pragmatic lesson to be learned from these evaluations – of 
particularly relevance in Romania also – is the importance of taking the 
political environment into account in designing the evaluation scheme. The 
inability to persuade the political actors of the importance of the 
evaluation severely compromises its outcome. (Hübler 1997, Schmidt 1999). 
An important lesson to policy makers and researcher alike regards the 
insights on the functioning of the labour market mechanisms in the low-wage 
sector and on an appropriate selection of a behavioural model of decision 
making for both labour demand and supply . Understanding this mechanism 
will deeply influence the impact of ALMPs. (Hübler 2000) 
Finally, the German studies on program evaluation deliver models to 
solve the difficulties of inferring from experimental results on real-world 
implementations. (Schmidt 2000a, 2000b) They are thus models for dealing 
with experimental and non-experimental data and for appropriately using 
observational approaches in Romania. (Schmidt 1999, p.39) 
 
3.2. The Austrian Steel Foundation – An Evaluation Model? 
Relevant knowledge for the design of scientifically sound program 
evaluation could be gained by comparing the evaluation of two redundancy-
retraining programs: the Austrian Steel Foundation and the reconversion 
program of the formerly redundant in the Jiu Valley in Romania. (Winter-
Ebmer 2001, Chiribuca et. al 2000, Boboc 2000) 
The Austrian Steel Foundation (Stahlstiftung) is a highly innovative 
training program in its content and financing and could serve as a model 
for the Romanian case both with respect to the specificity and dimensions 
of re-structuring nationalised industries41 and to the rigid labour 
relations and the lack of labour mobility. 
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41 In the aftermath of World War 2 the Austrian steel industry was nationalised. See 
Winter-Ebmer, p.4 ff 




The Romanian program was economically and socially a failure whilst 
the Stahlstiftung was basically a rather successful project. Contrasting 
the features of the two programs in the way the are respectively reflected 
in evaluations (Winter-Ebmner vs. Chiribuca et. al) shed some new light on 
the importance of two aspects that should be considered in designing 
program evaluations: (i) specifying what type of market failure justifies 
the policy interventions and (ii) the weaknesses of evaluations understand 
as simple process analysis: hypothetical comparisons of ex-ante and ex-post 
situations. (Schmidt 1999, p.37) 
 
4. Conclusions for Romania’s Social Policy Evaluation – A Transaction Costs 
Approach? 
 
Several relevant lessons are to be learned from these evaluation 
studies and questioned if they could be imported to the Romanian evaluation 
practice. 
 
The first set of lessons is practical: how to design a complex 
evaluation, how to use administrative data, to choose the sample and the 
outcome measures, how to assess the (opportunity) costs of the program and 
the causal links. (Schmidt 1999, 2000a, 2000b) 
 
Fundamental Elements of Evaluation Research* 
(i) choice of the appropriate outcome measures 
(ii) assessment of the direct and indirect costs associated with the policy 
intervention 
(iii) attribution of effects to underlying causes 
(*) Source: own presentation drawing on Schmidt 1999 
 
The second set of lessons is concerned with how to structure program 
evaluations to provide policy relevant information. Two questions are of 
primordial importance with regard to this: the issue of persuasion and 
credibility of the evaluation and, interconnected with this, the overall 
institutional framework in which the evaluation culture is established42. 
For the Romanian social policy making - characterised by etatism, 
centralism and corporatist tendencies43 - a transaction cost perspective44 
offers a powerful tool for analysing how institutions evolved45 in this 
controversial field in recent years. A transaction cost approach will help 
understand the organising of policy evaluation in a rent-seeking post-
socialist system. The choice between ”in-house” and external evaluation – 
                                                           
42 Toulemonde 2000, Kirsch, Mackscheid 1985, Downs 1966. 
43 E.g. for this is the establishment (1997!) and the alleged role of The Economic 
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44 Dixit 1996. 
45 North 1990 




and by this the (un)biasedness of the evaluation – is to be regarded 
analogous to the choice between market and hierarchy. Moral hazard and 
adverse selection determine both the outcome of the program and of the 
program evaluation as well as the ”customs” in the evaluation industry. 
(see also Ch.1 of our paper) 
Without taking into account these fundamental questions of policy 
evaluation, the Romanian political debate will lack on evidence if social 
and labour market policy interventions are efficient tools for social 
betterment and for boosting employment or just another kind of political 
placebo. 
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Interview to the Health Strategy Office  
 
1. Since when does this office exist? Since when does it 
perform evaluations? 
2. What is the legal basis which regulates its activity? 
3. Why was the institution created? Who initiated/created 
it?  
4. What is the cycle of an initiative? Who initiates it? Who 
approves it? At what moment is the political approval 
called for? What is the role of evaluation? Who sends the 
programme to evaluation? 
5. How often does the legislation change? What is the basis 
of these changes? 
6. What type of evaluation do you perform? (post-factum, 
process, prognosis) 
7. What methods do you use? (costs-benefits, process-
indicators; outcome) 
8. Please, give me several examples from the experience of 
the department. 
9. What is going on: the feed-back. How is evaluation 
imbedded/taken into consideration in the decision 
process? 
9a. Does anybody perform a periodical review of the 
programmes? 
9b. Does anybody perform an analysis before creating a 
programme? 
9c. Was there any case of a programme being shut down as a 
result of evaluation? 
9d. Was there any case of a programme being changed as a 
result of evaluation? 
10. Staff/resources. What training did the staff of this 
service get? 
11. The position of the evaluation in the department: is 
evaluation compulsory or it only has an advisory role? 
12. What percentage of the budget of the ministry is 
subject to evaluation? 
13. Is the evaluation performed only at the national or 
also at the local level? 
14. How is the evaluation for the international 
programmes done? Who performs it? 
